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MANUFACTURER'S RESPONSIBILITY
By HAROLD V. McCoYt
I. INTRODUCTION
The most radical and spectacular development in tort law in this
century is the typical language describing the developments of the last
few years in the field of products liability. 'While retailers, wholesalers,
dealers and even lessors have been embraced within this rapidly expanding
field, there is little doubt that the main thrust has been against the manu-
facturer of the product. With the expansion of long arm statutes and of
concepts of what is doing business within a state, few large manufacturers
can now find themselves immune to suit in any state of the nation. It is
not impossible that with large chattels such as commercial transport air-
craft, we will see the day when the use of an airplane within any state will
confer jurisdiction over the manufacturer. Finally, though a few courts
have reasoned that liability without fault should be a legislative creation
rather than judicially imposed, it is a minority doctrine which may very
well become the law of the land. We can expect to see it the majority
doctrine within the foreseeable future. Liability without fault, ease of
acquiring jurisdiction and liberal approaches to the rules of evidence and
the inferences to be drawn should certainly have combined to the point
where we would expect to find the airplane manufacturer facing a new
and enlarged responsibility totally different from that heretofore known.
II. THEORIES OF LIABILITY
What at first glance appears to have been a bonanza for claimants
turns out after closer scrutiny to be not much different in the aviation
field from what we have always known. True there are more suits and
more recoveries today, but there are many factors other than legal develop-
ments which account for this increase in litigation. Historically, the air-
plane manufacturer has been responsible for negligence in the design and
fabrication of his product. McPherson v. Buick Motor dates back to 1916.
For fifty years it has been the law of this country that remote users of a
vehicle may sue the manufacturers with whom they have had no dealings
and may recover damages upon proof of fault in design or fabrication.
To be sure, there were two qualifications to that doctrine which some-
times defeated recovery. Contributory negligence of the claimant could
bar a recovery. That is a defense which is seldom raised, much less success-
fully applied to passengers in transport airplanes, and, therefore, it can be
disregarded. The other limitation on the McPherson doctrine, restriction
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to products which were imminently dangerous if defectively made, can
also be disregarded. An airplane defectively designed or fabricated is ob-
viously a dangerous instrumentality.
Essentially, therefore, airplane manufacturers have always been cast
in liability for defectively made products if the defect was negligently
introduced. Today, though, the need to show fault is under severe attack.
The Restatement of Torts defines this new revolutionary concept as
follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
So far it sounds like the old negligence rule since a defect in the product
which created an unreasonable danger was required. What was new was
the imposition of liability even though the seller had exercised all possible
care in the preparation of the product. Then, a defect once proven was
usually enough for a plaintiff to prevail. Today, this is even more certain
for there has been a progressive relaxation in the quantum and quality of
proof required to create a fact question for the jury to resolve. In New
York a typical instruction to the jury goes something like this:
When a manufacturer places upon the market a product which is of such
a character that when used for the purpose for which made it is likely, if
defectively made, to be a source of danger, the law implies a warranty . . .
that it is reasonably fit for the ordinary purpose for which it is used. If the
product is in fact defective and not reasonably fit to be used for its ordinary
purpose, the manufacturer is liable to any person properly using the product
for injury resulting from its defective and unfit condition.
In relation to commercial airliners, it is hard to visualize a case where
a plaintiff who proves that the airplane was defective and unfit for ordi-
nary use does not recover because he cannot prove negligence in the design,
testing, inspecting or fabrication of the aircraft. In the past, a defect
always had to be shown, and it had to be one arising from failure to
exercise reasonable care. But the technical proof establishing that a modern
airplane is not reasonably fit for use as an airplane will almost invariably
sustain a finding that the manufacturer was not careful enough.
Page Keeton, Dean of the University of Texas Law School, in discussing
proof of the manufacturer's negligence in a law review article, ended with
this conclusion:
There will inevitably be a considerable diversity of opinion about the kind
and quantum of evidence required as a basis for justifying the submission of
negligence on the part of the manufacturer of a product to the jury. More-
over, even if negligence as a requirement for liability is ultimately eliminated
and some form of strict liability is imposed, most of the same problems that
have been discussed herein will remain because plaintiff will be required to
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sustain the burden of showing a defect in the product that would make the
product unreasonably dangerous.
I do not mean to suggest that proof that an airplane was defectively
made or unfit for its intended use without proof of lack of due care
does not broaden the manufacturer's responsibility. It does, but, so far,
we have seen no cases where a plaintiff had to rely upon such a doctrine.
This is because of the very simple reason that in airplane cases, by the
time you finish proving the defect, you have proved the lack of due care,
and only very subtle technological complexities could give you one without
the other.
While there are fact situations upon which one could base an argu-
ment that the manufacturer, because of the state of the art, could not
have known of the defect, those situations are few and far between. More-
over, they do not usually involve mechanical reliability, but rather, the
characteristics of the product when used in the broader areas of operational
environment. Turbulence penetration is such an example. With trials being
held several years after the accident, too much has been learned during the
interim to expect that the corporate manufacturer can reasonably and
successfully restrict the juries' or judges' appraisal of the observance of
ordinary care to the standards of several years ago.
There has been an increase in recoveries, and there has been an increase
in litgation. However, this is just as much due to broadening the class of
claimants, more intense accident investigation, a tremendous increase in
traffic, lowering the standards of proof, more competent plaintiffs' repre-
sentation, and finally, a focus upon the manufacturer, rather than the
carrier, where the carrier had asserted the partial defense of the Warsaw
Convention.
III. EvIDENCE
Years ago, the total destruction of an airplane and the death of the
crew usually precluded, because of the lack of investigative tools then
available, any analysis of the accident which might involve the manu-
facturer. Today, no matter how total the destruction, whether on land or
sea, wreckage retrieval and analysis are relentlessly pursued and often
with good results. While it does not necessarily always establish a prob-
able cause, it frequently will be adequate to eliminate areas of probable
cause, such as fire, explosion, structural failure, or engine failure. This,
then, eliminates or narrows the possibilities. Thereafter, scrutiny of the
operational history of this type sometimes suggests broad combinations of
probable causes which are not contraindicated by the evidence. Such com-
binations, some involving the manufacturer, are now seen with increas-
ing frequency. While the proof supporting them will not always support
a civil case, such findings will guarantee that the manufacturer will be
named as a defendant along with the carrier. 'While Civil Aeronautics Board
findings are not admissable in civil suits, they often provide a guide to
the claimant's preparation.
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IV. MANUFACTURER AS A PARTY IN SUIT
As a general rule, we now find the manufacturer named as a defendant
in accidents where the causes are not readily discoverable. It is becoming
increasingly common to name the instrument manufacturer in accidents
where the instruments were being used. Though instrument malfunction
may be unprovable, instrument information presentation can always be
criticized. If by trial-time proof of a defect meeting civil law requirements
has not been developed, claimants still feel the effort has been worthwhile.
Incidentally, there are no penalties for losing, except the effort involved.
Claimants feel that extra preparation directed towards the manufacturer,
even if unsuccessful, further narrows the field of causation against the
carrier in its use, maintenance and operation of the aircraft. The claimant,
therefore, frequently feels that there has been a distinct benefit in gaining
access to the manufacturers records and expertise in his case against the
carrier.
No one has made a perfect airplane yet, and in every manufacturer's
files there will be engineer reports or customer complaints which can
sound damaging until explained. Claimants count on collecting such items
and hope there will be enough of them to at least sustain a jury question.
In addition, if there is some kind of a defect, claimants can and do count
upon the carrier, usually a defendant, to be a valuable and knowledgable
ally in shifting the blame to the manufacturer.
Despite this trend the manufacturer with his resources and knowledge
can prevail after careful preparation and presentation of what is invariably
complex technical proof if, in fact, the product is not defective.
V. NEW DEVELOPMENTS
Here, I refer to those cases where either with or without an attack on
the basic design, a complaint is made that instructions for safe use or the
warnings given have been inadequate. Dix Noel, a leading writer on the
subject, pointed out recently that, "This matter of inadequate directions
or warnings is of growing practical importance and deserves special em-
phasis. Often it is much easier to establish an inadequate warning than
to establish an inadequate design." Of course, in the commercial aircraft
field, inadequate warning and inadequate instructions for use cases should
not increase with the same incredible rapidity as they have in the field of
drugs, chemicals, or any other product which will be used by unsophisti-
cated consumers. Such airplanes will almost invariably be used by either
military or commercial air carriers. While the manufacturer is charged
with an expert's knowledge of his product, the air carriers using the
products are similarly charged. Their pilots and engineers, together with
their counterparts of the FAA, are frequently present during much of
the development stages. By the time the airplane is actually engaged in
commercial service, its characteristics and operating procedures are well-
known.
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A duty to warn of dangers in the use of the product exists even though
it is perfectly designed and made. There is no duty to warn of dangers
which are patent, which are discoverable on reasonable inspection, or of
which the purchaser has notice. Nor is there a duty to warn one in a
particular trade or profession against dangers generally known to that
trade or profession.
The type of user of transport aircraft, therefore, will usually, though
not always, be aware of the proper methods and the dangers associated
with incorrect usage. From many automobile cases and one or two air-
plane cases, it is clear that the manufacturer will not only have a duty
to warn of any foreseeable dangers at the time he delivers the product, but
he will have a continuing duty to warn of the dangers which are brought
to his attention after the product has been sold.
A most revolutionary case in this connection is Noel v. United Air Lines,
Inc. There, a Constellation was lost when an overspeeding propeller, which
could not be feathered, parted from its shaft. One way or another, fuel, be-
ing dumped, was ignited, and in the resulting fire the aircraft was lost. A
foreign air carrier was involved and apparently suit was brought only
against the propeller manufacturer. That manufacturer had received re-
ports of other overspeeds and decouplings over a period of eight years,
some resulting in minor problems and some resulting in extensive dam-
age, though none had caused any personal injuries or deaths. The manu-
facturer had been attempting to develop a fix and had actually developed
three by the time of the accident. One in particular, called "pitch-lock,"
was already on the market for six months, but apparently at the time
of the accident this fix was still available only for Douglas aircraft. The
case was tried without a jury since the Federal Death on the High Seas
Act was involved. The trial judge rendered judgment against the manu-
facturer upon the grounds that a repetitive history of overspeeds and
propeller separation, coupled with the manufacturer's failure to remedy
the situation, amounted to negligence. Judgment for the plaintiff was
affirmed on appeal on the same grounds, but also on two additional grounds.
The appellate court held that the manufacturer was negligent when it
delivered a system which was defective in design, that it had failed to
discharged its duty to the airline to warn of any unusual malfunctions,
and that it breached its continuing duty to make available remedial de-
vices. While the majority of the court concurred in the result, there were
several opinions delivered which voiced considerable concern about im-
posing at an appellate level findings of negligence not made by the trial
court and findings of negligence based on newly created duties and obli-
gations.
The finding that the system which was delivered in July of 19 5 5, about
a year before the accident, was defective in design was based almost wholly
on a history of malfunction. Absent was any proof that at the time of de-
sign reasonable care had not been observed. Possibly this finding can be ex-
plained on the grounds that the malfunction history had continued for
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so many years that as a matter of law there had to be a defect in the
design which could have been avoided by more care.
If long, continued history of malfunction could be a basis for such a
finding, it is difficult to follow how, then, there was a failure to warn of
the numerous malfunctions. One would suppose that the overspeed his-
tory could hardly escape the notice of the operators of the aircraft. Cer-
tainly domestic operators could not have escaped such knowledge.
It is the third finding, however, which is of most concern since it opens
up a whole new area of manufacturer's responsibility. Dix W. Noel, in
his treatise on manufacturer's liability for negligence, describes the view
accepted by the court, that there is a duty to develop with reasonable
promptness a safety feature to meet any known serious danger, as some-
what new. He even suggested this duty might be restricted to the aviation
field. He also pointed out that the court's position that there is a general
post-sale duty to offer the vendee a corrective safety device, which has
in fact been developed after the sale, may be somewhat novel.
The puzzle posed by the Noel case lies in the fact that the trier of the
facts never made a finding that there was fault or lack of due care in
the original design. Only the long history of malfunctions, during which
years corrective action was being attempted, was discussed by the trial
court. Possibly the explanation lies in the fact that the particular propeller
involved had been delivered only a year before the accident and some
seven years after the first model was introduced. The question occurs,
therefore, whether or not the appellate finding of negligence on the basis
of a defective product was based more on the duty to withdraw the
product until a fix had been obtained. In addition, the fact that a correc-
tive device was already on the market, though not ready for this airplane,
no doubt would predispose the court to finding against the manufacturer.
Mr. Noel feels that even where there is no negligence in furnishing a de-
fective system initially, there should be a duty to offer the corrective safety
device as soon as it is available in cases where it is evident that the original
design was dangerously defective.
The Noel case will no doubt be cited to sustain as many meanings as
the point of view of the reader dictates. While possibly it will be restricted
to its own facts, one can certainly see that in every product improvement
involving the safety of the aircraft, or the elimination of potential hazards,
the manufacturer's own efforts will be used not only to discredit the
original design, but to impose a new liability, i.e., the improvement was
not made soon enough.
If the Noel case becomes part of the general law, a whole new set of
questions and issues will arise. Standards of care in the line of product
improvement will have to be developed. Juries will have to resolve the
issue of whether there is fault in the amount of emphasis devoted to im-
proving a product already on the market. Since the amount of time and
effort spent in making the improvement can always be attacked, this de-
cision may substantially increase the manufacturer's responsibility. Finally,
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what will be the cutoff date for product improvement? It can be argued
that this duty necessarily continues, therefore, while the airplane is being
used anywhere in the world. More rationally, though, we can expect to
see the duty end when the hazard is no longer a foreseeably dangerous one.
The point will be, of course, where disagreement begins.
Gordon Close, in a 1966 article published in For The Defense, quoted
some correspondence he had received from a patent attorney on this sub-
ject. Since it points up the sociological issues involved, it is worth re-
printing:
The notion that technological innovation should be penalized by imposing
liability for not previously having introduced later-developed improvements
seems to me more than just unfair as between litigants. It militates against
technological change upon which all national hopes for abundance, leisure,
and high civilization primarily depend.
The Constitution provides for the patent system "to promote the progress of
science and the useful arts"; a large share of our federal budget is devoted
to research and development; and Congress enacts bill after bill to foster
scientific education. All this expresses a national policy to encourage and
accelerate technological innovation, and that policy would be opposed by the
novel notions of liability now advanced by the personal injury lawyers.
If liability for design negligence is to become a part of our law, it should
be based on legislative and regulative standards, not on a hopeless morass of
individual tort determinations. Moreover, if we are to live with design negli-
gence, liability should be found only where a specific finding is made that
the negligent design accused was negligent in light of the state of the art
and standards at least as early as the time the accused product was sold, not
at any later time.
While the extension and the application of the Noel doctrine yet re-
mains to be seen, it is probably safe to predict that fault finding in the
area of lagging product improvement is here to stay. Fortunately, most
of the major manufacturers do have ambitious product improvement
programs, and, in addition, close liaison with their users, so that in heavy
transport operations at least, inadequate instruction or failure to warn
will be a comparatively infrequent source of liability. However, the future
is very much open on lagging product improvement as a source of liability.
VI. CONCLUSION
This has not been a good year for forecasters; nevertheless, with a cer-
tain amount of reliability it can be predicted that the future will see the
manufacturer's responsibility only increase in the number of suits and
recoveries. Part of it will be due to the constantly expanding air travel.
Part of it will be due to a legal environment which is ever changing, and
only in the direction of increased legal responsibility.
In an industry where knowledge is acquired faster than planes can be
designed, redesigned and produced, "state of the art" will rarely be a
popular defense. We already hear it being urged that the risk of loss
should be imposed upon those best able to afford it. That this is a social
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change which should only be imposed by the legislatures is still being
debated.
The increase in the cases of commercial aircraft should not be significant.
Under the present guidelines of strict tort liability, the manufacturer has
both the means and opportunity of exonerating itself when exoneration is
due. It is more difficult, but well within bearable limits.
Product support organizations, when properly run, are more than cap-
able of reducing incidents arising out of a failure to warn or directions
for use to insignificant numbers. Improvement in product support and
communication between government, the various trade associations, the
carriers and the manufacturing industry is constantly increasing. In this
exchange lies the source of quickly identifying and correcting hazards
which only are disclosed through use.
In the small plane area, different problems are presented which, coupled
with increasing legal responsibility, might well result in an increase of
suits and recoveries. In this area, the consumer usually pursues aviation as
an avocation rather than a profession. Communication and product sup-
port are necessarily different. Nevertheless, the same rules of legal re-
sponsibility apply. In the areas of failure to warn and directions for use,
the consumer will rarely be an expert. Where such is the case, every rea-
sonably, foreseeable hazard encountered in the ordinary use of even a per-
fectly made product must be brought home to him.
The lawyer can hardly make a significant contribution to air safety in
the fields of design and fabrication. However, the lawyer might well have
something to contribute if he can bring home to the people responsible
for the advertising and the manuals that these are an integral part of the
product for purposes of legal responsibility, and more importantly, safety.
In striving for safety all that can be required is that which is practicable
in view of the risks involved. Since, in aviation, the risks and hazards are
considerable, so must the manufacturer's effort be considerable. Anything
less cannot be tolerated. Selfishly, the risks of economic loss dictates nothing
less. Since United States built aircraft carry the predominant part of the
world's passengers and cargo, we have an unusual responsibility and an
unusual opportunity to lead the way in making good airplanes even better.
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